

# STEREO *IMPACT*

## Performance Assurance Implementation Plan (PAIP)

STEREO-IMPACT-PAIP\_D.doc  
Version D – 2001-Nov-27

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David Curtis, UCB IMPACT Project Manager

## Document Revision Record

Rev.	Date	Description of Change	Approved By
A	2000-July-27	Phase A Report Draft	-
B	2001-June-25	Inputs from Project	
C	2001-Oct-24	Inputs from Project New CESR SWEA PAIP Appendix	
D	2001-Nov-27	Response to inputs from Project	

## Distribution List

Dave Curtis, UCB  
 Janet Luhmann, UCB  
 Ron Jackson, UCB  
 Robert Ullrich, UCB  
 Mario Acuna, GSFC  
 Tycho von Rosevinge, GSFC  
 Alan Cummings, Caltech  
 Glen Mason, UMD  
 Reinhold Mueller-Mellin, Keil  
 Trevor Sanderson, ESTEC  
 Claude Aoustin, CESR  
 Harry Culver, GSFC

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# 1. GENERAL

## 1.1. *Basis and Scope of the Plan*

This document has been written in response to the Draft STEREO Safety, Reliability & Quality Assurance Requirements document (November 1999), as called out in the Phase A Statement of Work.

The STEREO IMPACT (In situ Measurements of Particles and CME Transients) investigation shall provide a suite of particle instruments for the NASA STEREO mission. The IMPACT project is an international effort of several universities, laboratories, and NASA. The Principal Investigator (PI) for IMPACT is Dr. Janet Luhmann at the University of California at Berkeley (UCB), and the IMPACT Project Manager (PM) is David Curtis, also at UCB. Note that the term PI in this document refers to Dr. Luhmann or a designated member of the IMPACT team under her authority. The allocation of hardware development responsibilities amongst the team is called out in the STEREO/IMPACT Phase A Report. This PAIP covers that part of the development effort performed at UCB and its subcontractors. Other NASA-funded institutions providing IMPACT flight hardware (Caltech, GSFC, UMD) shall conform to this PAIP. Non-NASA-funded institutions (foreign Co-Investigators) shall meet the Performance Assurance requirements called out by their funding agency, and so are generally not covered by the PAIP. Short descriptions of the Performance Assurance plans for European Co-Investigators providing flight hardware are included in Appendix B of this document.

In this document, unless otherwise stated, the terms Project and GSFC refer to the STEREO Project office at GSFC, as represented by the STEREO Project office Instrument Manager for IMPACT.

## 1.2. *General Requirements*

The PI for the STEREO IMPACT instrument suite will establish an organized program which will demonstrate that the design meets the functional requirements, including margins, has been manufactured properly and that it will operate properly in association with other project components. This will be accomplished by conducting analyses, tests and inspections.

The performance assurance program will encompass flight equipment, critical GSE (\*), Flight Software and spare flight equipment. This plan will be used by the PI and all Co-investigators who fabricate or test such equipment. This plan does not apply to ground support, mission operation, data analysis equipment or software except where specifically called out.

(\*) Critical Ground Support Equipment (GSE) includes that parts of the IMPACT GSE that interfaces directly to the flight hardware in such a way that failure or incorrect operation could damage the flight hardware. The requirements of this PAIP only apply to such GSE as required to ensure the safety of the flight hardware.

### **1.3. Use of Previously Designed, Fabricated, or Flown Hardware**

Any previously designed or fabricated section of the hardware used on IMPACT will be subject to the PA requirements of this PAIP.

### **1.4. Flow-Down of PA Requirements**

The PI will ensure that all vendors and subcontractors who supply hardware for the IMPACT instrument suite will meet applicable PA/QA requirements.

### **1.5. Surveillance**

The work activities, operations, and documentation performed by NASA funded IMPACT institutions and their suppliers are subject to evaluation, review, audit, and inspection by government-designated representatives from GSFC, the Government Inspection Agency (GIA), or an independent assurance contractor (IAC). GSFC will delegate in-plant responsibilities and authority to those agencies via a letter of delegation, or the GSFC contract with the IAC.

The PI and/or subcontractor, upon request, shall provide government assurance representatives with documents, records, and equipment required to perform their assurance and safety activities. The PI shall also provide the government assurance representative(s) with an acceptable work area within developer facilities.

### **1.6. SR&QA Verification**

The PI will provide GSFC or their representative with any documents and records outlined in the PAIP upon request.

### **1.7. Applicable Documents (Appendix A)**

To the extent referenced herein, applicable portions of the documents and revision levels listed in Appendix A form a part of this document.

## 2. ASSURANCE REVIEW REQUIREMENTS

### 2.1. *General Requirements*

The PI will support a series of system-level design reviews that are conducted by an independent review team. The reviews will cover all aspects of the flight hardware, critical ground support hardware, flight software, and operations.

In addition the PI will support informal subsystem-level engineering peer reviews as required by the Project. These peer reviews will be coordinated with Project and will include Project representatives and Project-designated reviewers. Resulting action items shall be tracked on the Project Action Item database, *and the GSFC Instrument Manager shall concur with closeouts.*

### 2.2. *GSFC Flight Assurance Review Requirements*

For each system-level review, the Project Manager will:

- Organize an oral presentation of materials from the instrument development team to the review team. Preliminary copies of the viewing material will be furnished to the review team one week before the review, with a final version furnished at the time of the review.
- Support splinter review meetings resulting from the major review.
- Produce written responses to recommendations and action items resulting from the review.

### 2.3. *Flight Assurance Review Program*

The PI will support the following instrument design reviews:

- a. A Preliminary Design Review (PDR) which is to occur when the preliminary design is completed.
- b. A Critical Design Review (CDR) which occurs before the bulk of the flight fabrication begins.
- c. Pre-Environmental Review (PER) which occurs after the instrument suite is complete and before the full environmental tests are performed (in the event that some of the instrument is complete and ready to test before the entire suite is ready, the PER will be moved forward to occur before the first environmental tests).
- d. A Pre-Shipment Review (PSR) which occurs prior to shipping the instrument suite to the spacecraft for integration.

In addition, the PI will support observatory level design reviews, including the Observatory PDR, CDR, MOR, PER, FOR, PSR, and FRR, as well as the subsystem Peer Reviews mentioned above.



### 3. PERFORMANCE VERIFICATION REQUIREMENTS

#### 3.1. *General Requirements*

A Performance Verification program will be conducted to ensure that the flight hardware meets the mission requirements. The program consists of a series of functional demonstrations, calibrations, analyses, physical measurements, and environmental tests which simulate the environments encountered during handling and transportation, pre-launch, launch and flight. All flight hardware will comply with the requirements of this PAIP. In the event that spare instrumentation is used, it will be verified prior to flight.

The applicable environmental verification program is described in GEVS-SE, as modified by environmental test specifications provided by STEREO Project (APL STEREO Document 7381-9003) based on system-level information.

#### 3.2. *Documentation Requirements*

The IMPACT Project Manager will be responsible for managing the collection and distribution of verification documentation. This documentation will include a Verification Matrix, Environmental Test matrix, Verification Procedures, and Verification Reports. Verification documentation shall be available on request, and shall be summarized at design reviews.

##### 3.2.1. Verification Matrix

The Verification Matrix shall show the flow-down of science and mission requirements and the method of verification for each requirement.

##### 3.2.2. Environmental Test Plan

The Environmental Test Plan shall summarize the environmental tests to be performed at each level of assembly. Test levels, cycles, and special provisions will be called out.

##### 3.2.3. Verification Test Procedures

Verification Test Procedures will be developed for all tests conducted at the component level and above. Such procedures will be at least a lab notebook level of formality.

##### 3.2.4. Verification Test Report

A test report will be generated for each test at the component level and above. This report will show the degree to which the test objectives were met, how well the data correspond to the expected results, and any other significant findings. They will include as-run procedures and test data. Such reports shall be at least a **logbook** level of formality.

#### 3.3. *Demonstration of Failure-Free Operation*

At the time of delivery of flight hardware to spacecraft integration, it shall have demonstrated trouble-free operation for at least 100 hours without significant change to the hardware. A “Significant Change” generally means any work on the item that calls into question the validity of the previous test results, such as a repair or part replacement.

### **3.4. Comprehensive Performance Test**

A set of Comprehensive Performance Tests (CPT) shall be used before, in some cases during, and after environmental tests to verify the end-to-end performance and functionality of the instruments. These tests shall also be used at spacecraft integration and test as a validation of instrument functionality. Unfortunately, some instrument performance characteristics can only be verified in vacuum or at a special facility, but the CPT will be designed to verify as much as possible of the system, and provide a baseline against which to compare subsequent test results.

## 4. SAFETY

### 4.1. *General*

The PI shall plan and implement a system safety program that accomplishes the following:

- a. Identifies and controls hazards to personnel, facilities, support equipment, and the flight system during all stages of project development. The program shall address hazards in the flight hardware, associated software, ground support equipment, and support facilities.
- b. Support Project plans to ensure the design meets the system safety requirements of EWR 127-1 "Range Safety Requirements Eastern and Western Range". for the Eastern launch site (KSC) and KHB 1710.2D, "Kennedy Space Center Safety Practices Handbook".
- c. Support Project plans to ensure the design meets the baseline industrial safety requirements of the institution, EWR 127-1, as well as any special contractually imposed mission unique obligations.

### 4.2. *System Description and Safety Assessment Report*

The IMPACT Phase A Report includes a detailed description of the system down to the subsystem level. This document shall serve as a baseline for the STEREO Project Safety Manager (PSM). A preliminary assessment of the IMPACT instrument's compliance with the requirements of section 4.1 follows. The PI shall continue to identify, analyze, and minimize hazards throughout the development effort. All hazards affecting personnel, launch vehicle hardware, or the spacecraft shall be identified and brought to the attention of the PSM. A synopsis of the on-going safety analysis, consistent with the maturity of the subsystem design, shall be part of each subsystem presentation at peer level and system level independent design reviews.

#### 4.2.1. Preliminary Safety Assessment

The only unusual identified hazards related to the IMPACT instrument suite development and test are:

- a) High Voltage: The instrument contains a number of high voltage supplies, as high as 3400V. There shall be no exposed high voltage. The supplies shall be resistively current limited on the output. The instrument can be damaged by inadvertent operation of the supplies in air. This risk is mitigated by the use of red tag disable plugs and/or green tag enable plugs, multiple series commanding interlocks, plus appropriate hazardous procedure interlocks.
- b) Radiation Sources: Low level radiation sources shall be used during the calibration and test of the instruments. These sources do not fly with the instrument, but will be used during instrument and spacecraft functional tests. These sources will be handled by qualified personnel using appropriate handling procedures.
- c) Non-Explosive Actuators (NEA): The instruments shall contain in-flight deployable covers using non-explosive actuators. The IMPACT boom deployment is also planned to use NEAs. None of these actuations are expected to present a personnel hazard.

Enable or disable plugs will be used to prevent unintended actuation that might expose a detector to contamination or damage the boom by deployment in 1G.

#### **4.3. Procedure Approval**

The PI shall submit, in accordance with the contract schedule, all ground operations procedures to be used at GSFC facilities, other integration facility, or the launch site. All hazardous operations as well as the procedures to control them shall be identified and highlighted. All launch site procedures shall comply with the applicable launch site safety regulation.

#### **4.4. Safety Noncompliance Requests**

When a specific safety requirement cannot be met, the PI shall submit to the GSFC PSM an associated safety noncompliance request that identifies the hazard and shows the rationale for approval of a noncompliance, as defined in the applicable launch site safety regulation.

#### **4.5. Support for Safety Working Group Meetings**

The PI shall provide technical support to the STEREO Project Safety Manager for safety working group meetings, when necessary.

#### **4.6. Safety Data Package, Launch Site Safety Plan, and Orbital Debris Assessment**

The spacecraft contractor shall develop these documents. The PI shall provide input as required concerning the IMPACT instrument suite and its related ground activities that impact safety.

## 5. EEE PARTS REQUIREMENTS

### 5.1. *General Requirements*

UCB will conduct a parts control program covering the selection, procurement, and acceptance of EEE parts used on the STEREO IMPACT Instrument Suite. This section of the PAIP shall serve as the IMPACT Parts Control Plan.

The UCB Project Manager is responsible for implementation of the parts control program. Parts selection and screening plans will be done by various engineers working on the project, with final approval by the Parts Control Board (see 5.8). Parts testing, when required, will be performed by engineers assigned to the project, and/or outside vendors.

Note that non-NASA funded institutions providing hardware to the IMPACT instrument suite will use the parts control program mandated by their funding institution (see Appendix B). It is assumed that the parts quality level shall be similar to that imposed in this section on the NASA-funded institutions. At a minimum, sections 5.2.1 and 5.5 shall apply to all flight hardware.

### 5.2. *Parts Selection*

Parts will be selected and processed in accordance with GSFC Specification GSFC-311-INST-001 for Grade 2 quality level. Parts will be preferably selected from the following sources:

- a) Parts listed in the GSFC Preferred Parts List (PPL), or the NASA Standard Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical (EEE) Parts List (NSPL), MIL-STD-975. Where differences in requirements exist between the PPL and the NSPL, the PPL should take precedence. Parts should be procured in accordance with the appropriate specification designated for that part.
- b) MIL-M-38510, Class B or better microcircuits procured from a Qualified Products List (QPL) supplier. Additional PIND testing is required for class B parts.
- c) MIL-I-38535, Class Q or better microcircuits procured from a Qualified Manufacturers' List (QML) supplier. Additional PIND testing is required for class Q parts.
- d) MIL-H-38534, Class H or better hybrid microcircuits procured from a Qualified Manufacturers' List (QML) supplier. Additional PIND testing is required for class H parts, plus precap visual or DPA.
- e) Standard Military Drawing (SMD) microcircuits procured from an authorized supplier as listed in the SMD.
- f) Microcircuits compliant with paragraph 1.2.1 of MIL-STD-883 and procured from manufacturers having QPL or QML status for parts of the same technology. Parts procured from manufacturers without QPL or QML status should be procured with lot specific or

generic Group C Quality Conformance Inspection (QCI) data within one year of the lot date code of the parts being procured. MIL-STD-883 compliant microcircuits shall be subjected to PIND testing and DPA. Screening data shall be obtained with the parts.

- g) Manufacturers' in-house high reliability processed parts provided all screening tests listed in Appendix C of the PPL have been satisfied. The high reliability process flow should be that formally documented by the manufacturer in cases where changes would require a revision to the flow documentation. Tests not included in the manufacturer's high reliability flow must be performed by the manufacturer, an independent test facility, or by the developer. Parts procured in this section should be procured with lot specific or generic Group C Quality Conformance Inspection (QCI) data within one year of the lot date code of the parts being procured. If not included in the manufacturer's high reliability test flow, the parts should be subjected to PIND testing and DPA. Screening data shall be obtained with the parts.
- h) MIL-S-19500, JANTX, JANTXV and JANS semiconductors procured from a QPL listed supplier. It is preferred that semiconductors be procured to JANTXV level or better. Any semiconductor that has an internal cavity should be subjected to PIND.
- i) Established Reliability (ER) passive components procured from a QPL listed supplier for the appropriate military specification. Only ER parts within the minimum and maximum value ranges specified in the PPL should be considered acceptable. 50V ceramic capacitors used in applications <10VDC may require steady state humidity low voltage testing per 311-Inst-001A; refer to PCB. CSR09 and CSR13 capacitors require surge current testing per 311-Inst-001A and PPL.
- j) Parts procured to a GSFC S-311 specification from a GSFC approved source.
- k) Relays procured to MIL-R-39016, MIL-R-83536, MIL-R-6106, or MIL-R-83536 procured to failure rate M or better.

### 5.2.1. EEE Parts Identification List

A list of all parts used in the IMPACT instrument suite flight hardware will be maintained in electronic format by each IMPACT institution providing such hardware. The list shall be submitted to STEREO Project and the PCB for approval prior to their application. This list will include, as applicable:

- 1) Generic part type
- 2) Control specification
- 3) Part number
- 4) Manufacturer
- 5) Lot # and/or lot date code
- 6) Where used
- 7) Total quantity used
- 8) Screening required, status

## 9) Project Approval Status

An as-built parts list shall also be maintained, typically in the form of as-built PWB loading documentation. Documentation shall include lot date code and, where applicable, serial number for each part is loaded on the board. Photographic documentation may also be used (see section 8.3). The as-built documentation shall also include lot/serial information on any replacement parts.

### 5.3. **Other Parts**

Other parts, not on any of the documents listed in section 5.2, and including Custom circuits (ASICs, MCMs etc.) will be purchased or screened in accordance with GSFC Specification GSFC-311-INST-001 for Grade 2 quality level. The Parts Control Board shall review and approve use of such parts and their application, procurement and screening plans/specifications.

For devices not covered under GSFC-311-INST-001, they shall be screened in accordance with the nearest applicable GSFC specification or military specification.

Devices with interval cavities shall be subject to PIND testing. Devices shall either have a pre-cap visual or a DPA performed.

Screening specifications shall fully identify the tests to be performed, the test conditions, failure criteria, and lot rejection criteria. For lot acceptance or rejection, the Percentage of Defectives Allowable (PDA) in a screened lot shall be in accordance with that required in the closest military part specification.

Part screening results, failed parts, parts subject to destructive tests, and non-flight parts subjected to non-destructive tests shall be archived and retained for the life of the mission, unless otherwise directed by the PCB.

#### 5.3.1. Magnetic Devices

Transformers and inductors will be manufactured at UCB using magnetic components purchased from Magnetic, Inc. and Phillips, to commercial specifications, and MWS Heavy Armored Polythermaleze wire (HAPT), also purchased to commercial specifications. Parts and wire will be carefully visually inspected before and after winding. Units may be potted using approved materials at UCB. Correct operation of the completed units will be verified by electrical tests and measurements as follows:

- DC Winding resistance
- Winding Inductance
- Turns ratio or Voltage Ratio
- Polarity
- Dielectric Withstanding Voltage
- Induced Voltage
- Self Resonant Frequency
- Visual

Qualification shall be based on similarity; the same procedures and personnel will be used that have fabricated magnetics at UCB for several successful NASA missions.

Caltech magnetics shall be manufactured by John Gilbert, whose facility was source-inspected for ACE by JPL magnetic specialists.

### 5.3.2. Plastic Encapsulated Microcircuits (PEMs)

The use of PEMs shall be restricted to applications where no similar high reliability hermetically sealed device exists.

Each lot of PEMs shall be qualified by subjecting samples to Highly Accelerated Stress Testing (HAST) or Steady State Temperature Humidity Bias Life testing in order to qualify and assess overall package integrity of the lot.

All PEMs shall be subjected to screening to eliminate random early life failures, including temperature cycling, burn-in, electrical measurements and C-SAM (C-Mode Scanning Acoustic Microscopy).

The PCB shall approve the details of the qualification and screening procedures.

PEM may be susceptible to moisture intrusion, and shall be protected during shipping, storage, and assembly. The flight units shall be packaged in a Moisture Barrier Bag with desiccant and humidity indicator cards.

### 5.3.3. Units and Subassemblies

Function of units or assemblies that are purchased as "off the shelf" hardware items shall be analyzed for mission criticality. When loss of off the shelf units does not compromise mission success, on a case-by-case basis, these units may be considered exempt from the parts control requirements of this section, subject to approval of the program office and the parts control board. However, additional unit level testing such as thermal cycling or thermal vacuum testing, may be directed by the PCB or project in lieu of additional part level screening.

When failure of such units represents significant compromise to mission success, an analysis of the parts used within the units shall be performed. The parts shall be evaluated for screening compliance to GSFC 311-INST-001, established reliability level, and include a radiation analysis. Pending the results of this investigation, units may be required to undergo modification for use of higher reliability parts, or Rad hard parts. All upgrade parts shall be subject to PCB approval.

Modifications such as additional shielding for radiation effectiveness or replacing radiation soft parts for Rad-Hard parts, may be recommended.

### 5.3.4. Field Programmable Devices

Field programmable devices such as PROMs that cannot be fully tested prior to programming shall be re-screened following programming, including burn-in and final electrical functional. Note that



Actel FPGAs do not require re-screening beyond that performed by the programmer, per the manufacturer's recommendation:

[http://www.actel.com/appnotes/ppbi\\_dc.pdf](http://www.actel.com/appnotes/ppbi_dc.pdf)

#### 5.3.5. PIND Testing

Parts from lots exceeding 25% PIND failure must be reviewed by the PCB for approval. This includes PIND testing for devices covered by section 5.2 also.

#### 5.3.6. Destructive Physical Analyses (DPA)

DPA procedures, sample size and criteria shall be performed per GSFC specification S-311-M-70 (TBR), Destructive Physical Analysis. For small procurements, small lot sampling per 311-M-70 may be used. The PCB on a case-by-case basis shall consider variation to the DPA sample size requirements, due to quantity used in flight, application criticality, part complexity, availability or cost.

#### 5.4. *Derating*

All flight parts will be derated to the levels of PPL, Appendix B.

#### 5.5. *Radiation Tolerance*

All EEE parts shall be selected to meet their application design requirements in the predicted radiation environment, including TID and SEE.

Parts shall have a TID tolerance of 8 Krads or more, based on manufacturers data sheet, demonstrated technology hardness, or lot testing. Shielding or special packaging may be used to achieve the desired tolerance. 8 Krads assumes 75mils aluminum shielding or equivalent (a dose vs. depth curve will be provided in the APL Environmental Specifications document, 7381-9003)

Parts shall be SEL-immune to a LET of  $>80 \text{ MeV-cm}^2/\text{mg}$ , or else shall be protected against damage by a protection circuit. Parts that may affect critical functions that could damage the instrument shall be SEU-immune, or else shall use a Triple-Modular-Redundancy scheme to avoid any single SEU causing a failure. Parts shall meet these criteria based on manufacturers data sheet, demonstrated technology hardness, or lot testing.

The rational/analysis/test data demonstrating the radiation tolerance of each part shall be documented.

#### 5.6. *Alerts*

The instrument team will respond to GIDEP Alerts and NASA Advisories forwarded by STEREO Project (GSFC), and determine if any flight hardware or parts inventory is affected. In-coming EEE parts into the STEREO flight stock will be screened against the GIDEP database. Any parts for which there is an open Alert will either be removed from the flight stock and/or hardware or referred to the PCB.

### **5.7. Parts Age Control**

Integrated Circuits and Semiconductors that have a lot date code or screening record older than 7 years at the time of installation into PWBs shall be subjected to a room temperature re-screen and sample DPA as necessary per PCB recommendation.

### **5.8. Parts Control Board**

A Parts Control Board shall be set up to approve the screening and use of non-standard parts, re-testing due to age, failure history, GIDEP Alerts, or other reliability concerns, and other parts related issues called out above. The PCB shall include STEREO Project Parts Engineer and System Assurance Manager, in addition to an IMPACT subsystem lead engineer, QA, or parts engineer (depending on what system is involved) and the IMPACT Project Manager. Given the geographic distribution of the team, PCB actions will typically take place informally by phone or e-mail. Most PCB functions shall be performed by e-mail, but occasional telecons will be set up when there is a specific issue to discuss. Documentation shall consist of the e-mail exchange and the annotated PIL and related documents attached to such e-mail. The PIL shall be the summary of the agreements reached by the PCB, including approval, screening requirements, etc.

In the event that the PCB cannot reach consensus on a parts issue, the issue will be forwarded to the STEREO Project Manager for disposition.

## 6. MATERIALS AND PROCESSES CONTROL REQUIREMENTS

### 6.1. Selection Requirements

#### 6.1.1. Compliant Materials

Compliant materials will be used in the fabrication of flight hardware to the extent practicable. In order to be compliant, a material must be used in a conventional application and meet these ELV criteria:

1. Hazardous materials requirements including flammability, toxicity, and compatibility as specified in EWR 127-1 (Sections 3.10 and 3.12).
2. Vacuum Outgassing requirements as defined in paragraph 6.1.6.
3. Stress corrosion cracking requirements as defined in 6.1.5.

#### 6.1.2. Noncompliant Materials

A material that does not meet the requirements of section 6.1.1, or meets the requirements of section 6.1.1 but is used in an unconventional application shall be considered to be a noncompliant material. A Materials Usage Agreement (MUA) and/or a Stress Corrosion Evaluation Form be submitted to the GSFC STEREO Project for concurrence for all noncompliant materials.

No pure Tin shall be used due to Tin Whisker problem.

#### 6.1.3. Conventional Applications

Conventional applications or usage of materials is the use of compliant materials in a manner for which there is extensive satisfactory aerospace heritage.

#### 6.1.4. Nonconventional Applications

The proposed use of a compliant material for an application for which there is limited satisfactory aerospace usage shall be considered a nonconventional application. In that case, the material usage shall be verified for the desired application on the basis of test, similarity, analyses, inspection, existing data, or a combination of those methods. This information shall be provided to the GSFC Material Assurance Engineer during design reviews or other project meetings. The proposed use of a material in a nonconventional application requires that a MUA be submitted to the GSFC STEREO Project for concurrence.

#### 6.1.5. Inorganic and Metallic Materials

A MUA and stress corrosion cracking evaluation form shall be submitted to Project for each material usage that does not comply with the MSFC-SPEC-522 stress corrosion cracking requirements.

#### 6.1.6. Non-metallic Materials

Materials will be noncombustible or self-extinguishing as much as possible. The outgassing properties of organic materials will be considered in their selection. When tested to ASTM E-

595, compliant materials will have less than 1 percent total mass loss and less and 0.1 percent collected volatile condensable mass.

Solithane conformal coat materials shall be avoided, with Uralane being preferred.

#### 6.1.7. Fasteners

Fasteners shall be selected and screened in accordance with 541-PG-8072.1.2.

#### 6.1.8. Lubricants

No lubricants are expected to be used. Should lubricants be required, they will be included in the Materials list approved by Project.

#### 6.1.9. Consideration in Process Selection

Manufacturing processes will be selected so as to minimize changes to the material's properties.

#### 6.1.10. Shelf Life Controlled Items

Polymeric materials with an uncured limited shelf life will be identified with manufacturing data and storage conditions. Regular purchases of limited shelf life materials will be planned to assure that current date code materials are always available. Out of date materials will not be used on flight hardware.

Any other limited life material will be identified in the Limited Life Items list discussed in section 7.4.

#### 6.1.11. Magnetism Compatibility

Materials shall be selected non-magnetic wherever possible. Use of any magnetic materials shall be reviewed with Project and the Magnetometer Co-Investigator to determine acceptability of use.

### 6.2. **Documentation**

Documentation for materials and processes control will include:

- a. Engineering Drawings for materials application
- b. Materials and Processes List

The material list will be available to the Project.

### 6.3. **GIDEP Alerts**

Materials selection and usage records sufficient to determine applicability of any Government Industry Data Exchange Program (GIDEP) alert shall be maintained. These records shall typically be kept in the form of material Certificates of Compliance in the shop traveler or QA records.

Historical GIDEP Alert status shall be reviewed on receipt of materials, and new GIDEP alerts shall be checked against flight stock. Any material against which there is an open Alert shall be removed from flight stock or referred to the MRB.

## **7. DESIGN ASSURANCE AND RELIABILITY**

### **7.1. Requirements**

The IMPACT instrument suite and associated test equipment will be designed to:

- a. Function properly during the mission lifetime,
- b. Minimize or eliminate human-induced failures,
- c. Permit ease of assembly, test, fault-isolation, repair, and maintenance without compromising performance, reliability, or safety aspects.

### **7.2. Implementation**

The Project Manager shall ensure that system-level design and trade studies include reliability considerations. Areas where significant improvement in reliability can be achieved at the cost of increased resource requirements shall be passed on to Project. At the subsystem level, lead subsystem engineers will be responsible for reliability issues concerning their subsystem, and shall bring to the attention of the Project Manager any reliability concerns outside the scope of their allocated resources.

### **7.3. Failure Modes and Effects Analysis**

A formal FMEA shall be performed at the spacecraft interface level to identify failures that can propagate beyond the instrument. A less formal analysis shall be performed by the Project Manager, together with subsystem engineers, as part of the design process to identify likely failure modes and mitigation schemes.

The IMPACT team shall also provide design data to Project as required to aid in the development of Reliability Assessments (RBDs, PRAs, FMEA, and FTAs), and will analyze the results of the these analyses and consider with Project possible risk mitigation trades.

### **7.4. Limited Life Items**

Limited life items shall be identified and avoided when possible. The Project Manager shall compile a list of limited life items with input by the subsystem engineers. This list shall be provided for approval to Project. Limited life items include all hardware that is subject to degradation due to age, operating time, or cycles, such that its expected useful life is less than twice the required life, when fabrication, test, storage, and mission operation are combined. The Project Manager shall maintain a record of total operating times for these items.

### **7.5. Trending**

A set of measurable parameters that relate to performance stability shall be identified for each instrument. These parameters shall be measured and tracked as part of the standard functional testing starting at the instrument level. Recording of these parameters shall be part of the standard Comprehensive Performance Test (CPT). As part of the analysis of the results of each CPT, changes in the trending parameters shall be analyzed. This process shall continue through spacecraft I&T and post-launch mission operations.

## 8. QUALITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS

### 8.1. *Support of Design Reviews*

QA issues and the status of the QA program will be addressed in the reviews identified in section 2.3.

### 8.2. *Configuration Management*

Configuration management is described in the STEREO and IMPACT configuration management plans:

460-PG-1410.2.1B: STP Program Configuration management procedure  
IMPACTCMPlan\_B: STEREO IMPACT Configuration Management Plan.

It is the responsibility of the design engineer to verify that the as-built configuration (as described in the traveler) is correct (compared to as-designed) prior to integration of an item into the next level of assembly.

### 8.3. *Identification and Traceability*

Part numbers will be provided on each sub-assembly or PWB. If sub-assemblies or assemblies are not unique, serial numbers will be used to identify them.

Mechanical parts will be serialized when they are not fully interchangeable. Significant sub-assemblies (such as a sensor assembly) will be serialized for traceability.

Records will be maintained (sometimes in the form of photographs) to support a trace of any non-interchangeable part or material to the board or unit in which it was placed. Parts from a given manufacturer with the same lot-date-code and screening history are considered to be interchangeable. Similarly, any board or unit will be traceable backwards to the parts or materials from which it was built. Thus, if an ALERT were to identify a problem part, IMPACT could determine all places where the part exists in the instrument.

### 8.4. *Procurement Controls*

The following procurement controls shall be imposed on all flight unit parts and materials purchases.

#### 8.4.1. Purchased Raw Materials

Purchase orders for raw materials will include a requirement for the results of physical and chemical tests, or a certificate of compliance. Exceptions shall be approved by the GSFC via a waiver request, based on evidence of the acceptability of the material for the intended use.

Suppliers of materials will be requested to make acceptance test results available.

#### 8.4.2. Age Control and Limited-Life Products

Records will be kept on products having characteristics of degradation with use or age. Records will note date, when useful life was initiated, and date when life expires.

#### 8.4.3. Inspection and Test Records

UCB will require where necessary that suppliers maintain inspection and test records. Records that are to be provided with the deliverable item will also be specified.

#### 8.4.4. Purchase Order Review

All purchase orders for flight articles to verify the correctness of the purchase requirements and that all applicable QA requirements have been included.

#### 8.4.5. Re-submission of Non-conforming Articles or Materials

If an article is deemed non-conforming by the contractor and returned to the supplier, the supplier will resubmit the article with evidence showing the article has been corrected, and with markings which clearly indicate that it is a "re-submitted part." Non-conforming items shall be handled by the process described in section 8.8.

### 8.5. **Receiving Inspection**

Upon receipt, all purchased products will undergo an inspection that includes:

- 1) Verification that documentation meets the requirements of the Purchase Order.
- 2) Verification that parts marking and packaging is consistent with the requirements of the Purchase Order.
- 3) Verification of correct parts count.

Parts will be handled in accordance with the UCB Space Physics Research Group ESD control plan (or equivalent contractor's plan), then bagged, marked, and placed into bonded flight stores. **Records shall be maintained for the life of the mission.**

### 8.6. **Fabrication Control**

#### 8.6.1. Manufacturing Certification Log

A Certification Log will be established for each manufactured component which will travel with the item through fabrication and inspection. Operations will be done per referenced documents, or documented directly in the log book. Torque values, part serial numbers, etc. will be noted, and all entries will be signed and dated by the operator. Entries will include results of in process testing.

#### 8.6.2. Workmanship

The following NASA workmanship standards shall be used in the fabrication of the IMPACT flight hardware:

Soldering - [NASA STD-8739.3](#)

Cable, Harness, and Wiring Interconnections - [NASA-STD-8739.4](#)

Conformal Coating and Staking - [NASA-STD-8739.1](#)

Printed Wiring Board Design - NHB 5300.4 (3K)

### 8.6.2.1 Worker Certification

All flight segment soldering, wiring, and conformal coating/staking will be by technicians certified and trained as required.

### 8.6.3. Process Control

Appropriate controls will be implemented for processes for which uniform high quality cannot be ensured by inspection alone.

## 8.7. **ESD Control**

ESD control will be accomplished by the techniques and process controls described in the UCB Space Physics Group Electrostatic Discharge Control Plan, Revision B, dated May 1990.

## 8.8. **Non-conformance Control**

The PI will perform non-conformance control for failures and discrepancies. (A failure is a non-conformance discovered in testing, while a discrepancy is a non-conformance discovered at other times) The PI will track non-conformances with a Non-conformance Report that includes the following information:

- 1) A description of the non-conformance,
- 2) Analyses to determine the fundamental cause and any impacts to the rest of the flight instrument,
- 3) Remedial action to be taken,
- 4) Verification of the removal of the non-conformance, and
- 5) Disposition of the non-conforming item.

Status of all failures and discrepancies shall be included in the monthly Technical Report to Project.

### 8.8.1. Discrepancies

#### 8.8.1.1 Documentation.

Documentation of discrepancies will begin with receipt of procured materials or fabrication.

#### 8.8.1.2 Initial Review Dispositions.

Discrepant products will be reviewed by engineering personnel to decide if they should be (a) returned for rework, (b) scrapped, (c) returned to supplier, or (d) submitted for MRB action. Initial reviews will be documented as described above.

#### 8.8.1.3 Material Review Board.

The PI will designate an MRB to review all non-conformances, chaired by the IMPACT Project Manager. Project shall designate a voting member of the IMPACT MRB.



The MRB will: determine dispositions, ensure remedial and preventive actions; verify implementation of all dispositions; and ensure accurate records are maintained. MRB dispositions will specify one of the following:

- 1) Repair: The MRB will approve repairs. Although standard repair procedures may be approved on a one-time basis, the MRB will track the number of standard repairs on a per unit basis to ensure that reliability or quality are not compromised by excessive repairs.
- 2) Use-as-is.
- 3) Waiver: To use or accept hardware at the spacecraft interfaces which does not meet contract requirements; this action will require GSFC Approval prior to implementation.

## 8.8.2. Failures

### 8.8.2.1 Reporting

A failure report will be written for failures that affect the function of the flight segment or could compromise mission objectives. **Other issues shall be recorded in the traveler.** Reporting will begin with the first functional test of the fully assembled component and will continue through the flight segment. All such shall be reported to the STEREO Project within one business day, with preliminary documentation provided within five business days. **A sample Problem Report form is shown:**



PROBLEM REPORT  
 PR-040  
 SAS ACS Data Incorrect  
 ADP  
 02-10-00

**PR-040 ADP SAS ACS Data Incorrect**

<b>Assembly :</b> IDPU	<b>SubAssembly :</b> ADP
<b>Component :</b> FSW	
<b>Originator:</b> D. Curtis	<b>Organization:</b> UCB
<b>Phone :</b> 510-642-5998	<b>Email :</b> dwc@ssl.berkeley.edu

**Problem Occurred During (Check all that apply ✓)**

Functional test      Qualification test      ✓ S/C Integration      Launch operations

**Environment when problem occurred:**

✓ Ambient      Post Vibration      Shock      Acoustic  
 Vacuum      Thermal-Vacuum      EMI/EMC

**Problem Description**

During testing of the ADP on the spacecraft, the SAS simulators were connected and operated to determine the ACS backup data sent from the IDPU to the spacecraft SEM. We expected to see a four second series of calculations, but saw a fixed pattern that repeated each .25 seconds.

**Analyses Performed to Determine Cause**

Removed the SAS Simulators and found that the programming PROM and Actels were not compatible. The units were, in fact, generating a pattern as described by the SAS ACS data.

**Corrective Action/ Resolution**

Load new version of ADP software 2-17-00. Verified correct SAS ACS data during IDPU level testing.

Distribution: Ron Jackson, Peter Harvey, David Curtis, Aliko

### 8.8.2.2 Failure Review Board.

The PI will designate an FRB to review each failure, chaired by the IMPACT Project Manager. Project shall designate a voting member of the IMPACT FRB.

The FRB will: determine dispositions, ensure remedial and preventive actions; verify implementation of all dispositions; and ensure accurate records are maintained. FRB dispositions will specify one of the following:

- 1) Repair: The FRB will approve repairs. Although standard repair procedures may be approved on a one-time basis, the FRB will track the number of standard repairs on a per unit basis to ensure that reliability or quality are not compromised by excessive repairs.
- 2) Use-as-is.
- 3) Waiver: To use or accept hardware at the spacecraft interface which does not meet contract requirements; this action will require GSFC Approval prior to implementation.

Failures shall be documented on the Problem Report form, which shall also document any diagnostic and analysis data, plus the final resolution. This form shall be signed-off by the FRB (including GSFC representative) for closure. Any level 1 failures shall be referred to the Project CCB for final disposition.

### 8.8.3. Alert Information

The PI will support the Alert program by determining the relevance of each Alert submitted to UCB. If action is required, the MRB will determine the approach to resolving the problem.

Sections 5.6 and 6.3 discuss Alerts further.

## 8.9. *Inspections and Tests*

UCB will plan and implement an inspection and test program that will demonstrate that applicable requirements are met. Inspection and in process testing will be completed prior to installation into the next level of assembly

Verification of soldering to NASA STD-8739.3 will be done by NASA certified personnel other than the original operator.

The component responsible engineer will review the hardware and documentation package prior to certification of readiness for the next assembly process.

The responsible engineer will perform an end-item inspection on each component. It will be verified that the configuration is as specified in the released design documentation, that workmanship standards have been met, and that test results are acceptable.

### 8.9.1. Inspection and Test Records

Inspection and test records will be included in the manufacturing certification log for each deliverable component, to show that all manufacturing operations have been performed, the objectives met, and the end item fully verified.

### 8.9.2. Printed Wiring Boards Inspections and Tests

Printed wiring boards shall conform to the requirements of Mil-P-55110E, and shall be qualified by inspection and test results. PWB coupons shall be evaluated by GSFC or a GSFC approved laboratory for evaluation and approval prior to loading with flight parts.

### 8.10. ***Metrology***

Verification of the accuracy of test equipment to the necessary levels during testing and calibration of the flight instrument will be done by a combination of calibration by outside vendors (traceable to NIST) and cross-checking of one unit against another. Equipment that has been calibrated shall have a label indicating the calibration date and how long that calibration is good for. The engineer making a measurement is responsible for ensuring that the calibration is current when a calibrated measurement is required. Any measurement that relates to the verification of performance, requirements, or calibration of the instrument should be made with calibrated equipment.

### 8.11. ***Handling, Storage, Marking, Shipping, Preservation, Labeling, and Packaging***

#### 8.11.1. Handling

No handling equipment is planned for the IMPACT project. In the event that a need for such equipment is identified, appropriate proof testing will be performed prior to use.

#### 8.11.2. Shipping

Shipping of the flight units or components will be done with the appropriate accompanying documentation and handling instructions.

### 8.12. ***Government Property Control***

UCB and its subcontractors shall be responsible for and will account for all property procured under the contract or provided by the government. The University property control system and standard government property transfer forms will be used to accomplish this.

### 8.13. ***End Item Acceptance***

Prior to shipment of the IMPACT Instrument suite, the Acceptance Data Package (as called out in the IMPACT Statement of Work, item 6002) will be assembled by the Project Manager and reviewed by Project or its designee at the Pre-ship review.

### 8.14. ***Ground Support Equipment***

That part of the Mechanical and Electrical Ground Support Equipment that directly interfaces with the flight hardware shall be of flight quality, and shall be subject to a subset of these Quality Assurance standards, such as Metrology, Non-conformance Control, Workmanship, Configuration Management, and Contamination Control as required. The quality level of all GSE shall be sufficient to ensure that the flight hardware connected to it is not compromised, and the operations performed with the GSE are consistent, correct, and safe.

## 9. CONTAMINATION CONTROL

### 9.1. *Project Requirements*

The IMPACT Instrument suite shall be built to meet the Project contamination control requirements as specified in 7381-9040b. In addition, IMPACT instrument contamination concerns are addressed here.

### 9.2. *IMPACT Concerns*

The STEREO IMPACT instruments contain contamination sensitive detectors (Microchannel Plate detectors and Solid State Detectors). The detectors are sensitive to dust, water, and most aromatic hydrocarbons. Some analyzers contain high voltages (up to 3500V). In addition, some surfaces such as radiators shall be contamination sensitive.

### 9.3. *Control Plan*

The instrument shall be fabricated from low-outgassing materials as discussed in section 6.1.6 of this PAIP to minimize contamination of itself or other instruments.

For the detectors, rather than impose a requirement on surface contamination, we rely on proven procedures. Measuring contamination buildup is very difficult since many of these detectors are buried deep in the analyzers. The procedures used have proven to be adequate on numerous previous missions.

The detectors are stored, handled, and installed into the flight instruments in appropriately clean environments (typically class 100 clean benches or storage containers) by experienced technicians. Flight parts and GSE used in the vicinity of sensitive detectors shall be thoroughly cleaned prior to use. In some cases, bakeout of subassemblies shall occur prior to integration of temperature and contamination sensitive parts to avoid cross-contamination or excessively long bakeouts at low relatively temperature.

Once installed into the flight hardware, the detectors are sealed behind covers with positive flow of high grade dry Nitrogen to prevent contamination. In this configuration, good housekeeping cleanliness levels (or bagging) are adequate to maintain the cleanliness of the exterior of the instrument. Prior to delivery to spacecraft integration, the exterior of the instrument shall be cleaned to meet the spacecraft-level cleanliness requirements. A bakeout (as called out in 7381-9040b), will be included as part of the subassembly thermal vacuum tests

GSE used in the vicinity of flight detectors shall be class 100 clean room compatible, and shall be thoroughly cleaned prior to use. Once the detectors are sealed into the flight unit, only good housekeeping requirements are placed on the GSE until such time as the instrument is cleaned for integration into the spacecraft.

Following cleaning and bakeout of the instruments for integration with the spacecraft, the instrument and GSE that must be used near the instrument must be maintained at adequate

cleanliness levels per the Project Contamination Control Plan. This will be achieved using clean rooms and/or bagging.

#### **9.4. *IMPACT Requirements on Spacecraft I&T and Operations***

Nitrogen purge shall be maintained on a near-continuous basis throughout I&T, at least up to encapsulation. Occasional outages in the Nitrogen flow can be tolerated for a few hours.

For tests that require the removal of the aperture covers, exposing the detectors, the instrument should be bagged or otherwise maintained in a class 100,000 environment or better, and Nitrogen flow should be continuous. Such exposures should be limited in duration to a few hours total. Alternatively, longer duration at a better cleanliness level can be tolerated.

Some of the solid state detectors will be cold in space, and so present an enhanced contamination problem due to condensation (especially STE). In some cases, where the detectors are exposed and cold (STE), reclosable covers have been provided so that the detectors will not be exposed during thruster firings.

Some of the analyzers contain high voltages (up to 3500V). These supplies can only be turned on in a good vacuum to avoid arcing. This implies outgassing requirements, thermal vacuum test requirements, and possibly powering off some of the supplies for thruster firings. Normal spacecraft materials requirements plus a 24 hour outgassing interval before powering up the supplies should be sufficient.

## 10. SOFTWARE ASSURANCE

### 10.1. *General*

The Space Physics Group at the UCB Space Sciences Laboratory has had considerable experience in the development of real time processor-based systems for spaceflight use (including the first microprocessor system flown on a NASA satellite - ISEE-1) and computer-based ground support equipment. The group currently includes persons of considerable ability and experience in the software area. The group has developed approximately 25 such systems over the past 15 years, all of which have been delivered on schedule and have been completely successful.

It is our intent to use the same type of organization and development procedures and coding practices on IMPACT that has proven to be successful on past programs.

Flight Software is the instrument computer code that runs in the micro processor(s) which are a part of the flight experiment package. Only Flight Software is covered by this document. GSE software shall be developed using reasonable practices, and shall only be controlled to the extent that critical GSE used for acceptance tests at the system level shall be under configuration control starting at the beginning of system-level testing.

### 10.2. *Software Development*

IMPACT software development includes the following subsystems:

- IDPU flight processor (UCB)
- SEP common electronics flight processor(s) (Caltech/GSFC)
- Instrument Command and Display GSE software (UCB)
- Science Display GSE Software (Caltech, UCB, UNH)
- Subsystem-level test GSE software (various)
- Mission Operations Software (UCB)

Software will be by a small team of programmers (typically one per subsystem). Control is maintained by the programmer for a subsystem, who is responsible for maintaining the code and incorporating all changes at a single location throughout its lifecycle.

[More details of the software development can be found in the IMPACT Software Development Plans.](#)

### 10.3. *Documentation*

The instrument software will be documented at a minimum by the following:

Software Development Plan	Describes the flight software development plan as called out in the IMPACT contract deliverables list.
Software Requirements:	Describes the functional requirements on the software to a level sufficient for a programmer to implement.
Software Users Guide:	Describes the software at the interface level for the end user (scientists, operations personnel and ground software programmers).

Software History Log:	This log will include all PFRs (with dispositions), results of acceptance testing, and detailed descriptions of any modifications made by uplinked code after launch. This is the programmers log book.
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The Software Development Plan and Software requirements may be combined. Separate plans and requirements may be developed for each separate subsystem, or they may be combined.

The subsystem programmer will be responsible for developing these documents and maintaining configuration control over them. This control will consist of reviewing and implementing any document changes, maintaining a revision code on all document updates, and distributing the documents for review to interested parties.

Software with a long life cycle (Flight software and some GSE software) shall also have sufficient design documentation to allow a new programmer to maintain and update the software if required.

#### 10.4. **Software Design Reviews**

Software specific reviews (as negotiated with Project) include:

- Software Requirements Review (which shall also cover the preliminary software design). This shall be an internal review with Project participation.
- Software Design Review (part of the formal instrument CDR)
- Critical Software Code Walkthrough (this is an internal review with Project participation)

#### 10.5. **Configuration Management**

Configuration control on the software will be performed by the subsystem programmer, and any change requests or bug reports will be communicated to him. Version numbers will be assigned and maintained by the subsystem programmer.

Prior to the beginning of acceptance testing, when the code is complete and ready to test, additional controls will be put in place. Any failures or change requests will be made to the subsystem programmer via the Problem/Failure Report system. The subsystem programmer will verify the problem and determine the cause. If the problem can be fixed without impacting the functionality of the rest of the code and does not have a serious schedule impact, he will proceed with the fix, and distribute a new revision of the code for further tests. Any instrument S/W modifications, no matter how seemingly minor, will be verified by a complete S/W acceptance test. Problems with greater impact will be submitted to a review board consisting of at least the subsystem programmer, the Instrument Project Manager, and the PI. The subsystem programmer shall maintain a logbook of all software PFRs.

When all PFRs have been dispositioned and the final version of the code has completed acceptance testing, the code will be committed to the flight PROMs and installed into the flight hardware. From this point on, all change requests or problem resolution will be made via the FRB/MRB mechanism described in section 8 of this PAIP. If a change is approved, the subsystem



programmer will implement the fix and issue a new release. The new release will be submitted to a full acceptance before again committing to PROM. No software will be used with flight hardware unless it is in a known documented and verified state.

Any code to be uplinked after launch will be submitted to the same level of configuration control as was levied on the final version of the flight code, including detailed acceptance testing on breadboards prior to uplinking the code. Any significant code uplink will be accompanied by a change in the code version number which is included in the instrument housekeeping, so that ground data processing software can determine what version of the software is running.

At all stages of the software development, a system of backups will be maintained to ensure that the failure of a system or media will not destroy more than 1 day's work. In addition, a backup copy will be maintained off-site, updated periodically.

## Appendix A - APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS

The following documents shall be applicable to this PAIP to the extent referenced herein.

<u>Document No.</u>	<u>Title</u>
GEVS-SE	General Environmental Verification Specification for STS & ELV Payloads, Subsystems, and Components, rev A, dated June 1996
EWR 127-1	Range Safety Requirements Eastern and Western Range
GSFC 311-INST-001	Instructions for EEE Parts Selection, Screening, and Qualification
GSFC PPL-21 Notice 1	Preferred parts list
MIL-STD-975 (NASA)	NASA Standard Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical (EEE) Parts List
MSFC-SPEC-522B	Design Criteria for Controlling Stress Corrosion Cracking
ASTM E-595	Standard Test Method for Total Mass Loss (TML) and Collected Volatile Condensable Materials (CVCM) from Outgassing in a Vacuum Environment (Re-approved 1999)
460-PG-1410.2.1B	STP Program Configuration management Procedure
IMPACTCMPlan_B	STEREO IMPACT Configuration Management Plan
7381-9040	STEREO Contamination Control Plan (APL document)
7381-9003	STEREO Environment Definition, Observatory, Component and Instrument Test Requirements Document
IMPACTEnvTestPlan	IMPACT Environmental Test Plan
541-PG-8072.1.2	Goddard Space Flight Center Fastener Integrity Requirements
<a href="#">NASA STD-8739.3</a> <a href="#">NASA STD-8739.4</a>	Requirements for Soldered Electrical Connections Requirements for Interconnecting Cables, Harnesses, and Wiring
<a href="#">NASA STD-8739.1</a>	Requirements for Conformal Coating and Staking of Printed Wiring Boards and Electronic Assemblies
NHB 5300.4 (3K)	Design Requirements for Rigid Printed Wiring Boards and Assemblies
-	UCB Space Physics Group Electrostatic Discharge Control Plan, Revision B, dated May 1990.
MIL-P-55110 Rev E	General Specification for Printed Wiring Boards
IDPU_SDP_A	IMPACT IDPU Software Development Plan
SEPSoftwareDevelopmentPlanC	SEP Software Development Plan

## Appendix B - Foreign Co-I Performance Assurance Plans

### **B.1 Product Assurance for SEPT Development at ESTEC**

Performance insurance requirements for the hardware produced by Space Science Department of ESA will follow the ESA standard procedures and rules published in Space Product Assurance Policy and Principle, ECSS-Q-00A, 19 April 1996 and associated documents listed in the table below.

Product Assurance within the Space Science Department of ESA is under the control of the Space Science Department Product Assurance Manager, Mr. Bengt Johlander. He will be responsible for all aspects of PA including parts selection, assembly, qualification etc, during manufacturing of the SEPT electronics.

Mr Johlander is head of the Flight Instrument Support Group of the Space Science Department of ESA, which has in the past been responsible for design and manufacture and PA/QA of SSD instruments on board ESRO-1, GEOS, HEOS, MAGIK, VIKING, ISEE-3 VEGA, GRO, PHOBOS, TETHER, ULYSSES, SOVA, WIND, Equator-S, SOHO, CASSINI-Huygens and CLUSTER II.

Space Science Department of ESA will do electronics for SEPT, University of Kiel will do the mechanics. Product assurance will follow this approach. After integration of SEPT into SEP and IMPACT we will leave PA/QA activities in the hands of SEP and IMPACT team.

**Table 1: Space product assurance policy and associated documents**

document name	document number, Iss./Rev.
Space Product Assurance, Policy and Principles	ECSS-Q-00A, 19 April 1996
Space Product Assurance, Quality Assurance	ECSS-Q-20A, 19 April 1996
Space Product Assurance, Dependability	ECSS-Q-30A, 19 April 1996
Space Product Assurance, EEE Components	ECSS-Q-60A, 19 April 1996
Space Product Assurance, Materials, Mechanical Parts and Processes	ECSS-Q-70A, 19 April 1996
Guide to applying the ESA software engineering standards to small software projects	BSSC(96)2 iss. 1, May 1996
Derating Requirements	ESA-PSS-01-301

#### **List of foreseen documentation**

Basically the documentation will follow ESA standard as stipulated in Space Product Assurance Policy and Principle, ECSS-Q-00A, 19 April 19. The list of foreseen documents is given in the table below.

SEPT requirements and specification document
SEPT user document
SEPT EGSE documentation and user manual
SEPT product assurance requirements
SEPT verification test procedures
SEPT verification test report
SEPT parts, material and process list
SEPT loose part list (if applicable)
SEPT open items list
SEPT interface control drawings (ICD)

SEPT technical drawings
SEPT manufacturing record (only for EM, FM and FS)
SEPT handling log
SEPT non conformance report list
SEPT request for waiver list

## ***B.2 Performance Assurance for SEPT Development at Kiel***

### **Performance Assurance Implementation Plan (PAIP)**

#### **for the STEREO IMPACT SEPT Sensors**

1. This Appendix to the STEREO / IMPACT Product Assurance Plan shall cover the product assurance procedures and requirements for the SEPT sensor heads provided by the University of Kiel, Germany. The SEPT sensor heads will be integrated with the SEPT electronics provided by the Space Science Department of ESA, which will provide a separate product assurance plan statement.

#### **2. Heritage**

The SEPT sensors are based on sensors, instruments, and experiments built and managed by the University of Kiel Team for the international space science project ULYSSES (COSPIN / KET), SOHO (COSTEP Experiment), and CHANDRA (Radiation Monitor). No major problems were encountered during these projects in complying with the product assurance requirements both from the project offices and from the experiment management.

#### **3. Product assurance statement from the University of Kiel IMPACT-SEPT Team.**

The University of Kiel STEREO / IMPACT / SEPT Team will comply with all applicable requirements and procedures described in the STEREO / IMPACT Product Assurance Plan (PAIP), [Revision D, November 26 2001](#). Procedures developed in previous projects will be used or updated to assure safety, quality, and reliability of parts, components, and items. The required documentation will be provided to support design, fabrication, and test control, reviews and acceptance/qualification. This will specifically include parts and material lists, thermal and structural analysis, contamination control, and configuration management.

#### **4. Product Assurance Requirements imposed by the German Funding Agency DLR**

No specific product assurance requirements are so far imposed by the German Funding Agency DLR nor have been imposed in previous projects. The application for funding sent to DLR provides for compliance with the product assurance implementation plan for the STEREO / IMPACT instrument suite. The compliance with the above plan, however, is based upon the financial support and conditions imposed by DLR once the grants for STEREO / IMPACT / SEPT are provided.

Preliminary Performance Assurance for SWEA (*SWEA-AP-43-CESR*)  
**Annex 2 : List of Documentation Provided**

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***B.3 Performance Assurance for SWEA Development at CESR***

Document SWEA-AP-0044-CESR, dated 04/10/00 attached, with minor modifications on 2001-Oct-23.